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THE INFLUENCE OF LAW-AND-ECONOMICS ON 
THE IDEOLOGICAL CENTER OF CIVIL 
SOCIETY: THE NEW AMERICAN FORMALISM 
WITH A EUROPEAN COUNTERPOINT  
 
“Things fall apart; the center cannot hold; 
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world” 
W.B. Yeats1 
ARGUMENT ROADMAP 
The struggle to identify the ideological “true center” of any society is 
daunting.2 There are as many approaches as there are political interests, 
and none can truly claim absolute impartiality.3 However, it is empirically 
settled that civilizations have an increased chance to experience golden 
ages and flourish when their institutions, customs, and practices most 
accurately represent the ideals that a significant majority of the population 
espouse, or can reasonably agree on.4 Those values will always have their 
most perfect expression in a societal “temperate” zone, what I will call 
throughout this Note the “true center,” since only in the middle the 
disparate interest groups may find common ground, and strive for a 
consensus.5 Working backwards from this assumption, the extremely 
                                                          
1  W.B. Yeats, The Second Coming, in YEATS’S POEMS 294 (Macmillan 1989). 
2  See Dan Balz, What’s Left of the Political Center? WASH. POST (July 5, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/whats-left-of-the-political-center/2014/07/05/37122966-
0447-11e4-8572-4b1b969b6322_story.html?. 
3  Scott Eric Kaufman, Noam Chomsky: The Problem with US Politics is the Spectrum is 
“Center to Extreme — Way off the Spectrum — Right,” SALON (Jan. 6, 2016), 
https://www.salon.com/2016/01/06/noam_chomsky_the_problem_with_us_politics_is_the_spectrum_i
s_center_to_extreme_way_off_the_spectrum_right/. 
4  See generally 1 EDWARD GIBBON, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 188, 
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uiug.30112072200139;view=1up;seq=24.  
5  Lee Drutman, We Need Political Parties. But Their Rabid Partisanship Could Destroy 
American Democracy, VOX (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.vox.com/the-big-
idea/2017/9/5/16227700/hyperpartisanship-identity-american-democracy-problems-solutions-doom-
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polarized political climate currently present in the United States may 
provide a clue that the social and political discourse has indeed moved far 
from its “true center.” 
Throughout this Note whenever I refer to the “true center” of society, 
the meaning I wish to convey will be precisely tied into a positive 
confluence of social phenomena that, in the aggregate, facilitates 
cooperation and synergy and, implicitly, the thriving of a civilization.6 It 
will be my assumption as well that it is desirable to have as much 
“centrist” discourse as possible, both in the name of stability and order 
(which the “right” highly values) and for the sake of true progress and 
equality of opportunity (satisfying the basic needs of the “left”).7 
                                                                                                                                    
loop (“We now have two political parties with very different and increasingly irreconcilable ideas 
about what it means to be American, and, perhaps more saliently, what it is to be un-American.”). 
6  The concept of a “true center” may appear to be itself a normative proposition; who can say 
what is the appropriate center of a whole society at any point in time, and how is one to find a 
methodology to properly support the existence of such a concept? However, I believe that there is 
sufficient empirical data that may support the existence of an identifiable “temperate zone” of societal 
discourse as well as that zone’s positive influence on the development of a society. The very idea of a 
civilization’s “Golden Age” seems to imply that there are certain conditions of fact that facilitated the 
emergence of that “age.” Pericles’ Athens did not just randomly happen; there were significant factors 
that contributed to that explosion of enlightened thought and action. These “golden age” conditions 
can be investigated empirically, even though such an endeavor is beyond the scope of this Note. See, 
e.g., Thomas T. Thomas, Formula for a Golden Age, POL. & ECON. (Dec. 24, 2011), 
http://www.thomastthomas.com/Formula_for_Golden_Age_122411.htm. For an European comparison 
evidencing a similar idea, see also Neil Clark, The Modern Left Has Much to Learn from Austria’s 
Golden Age, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 2011), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/jan/21/modern-left-austria-bruno-kreisky. 
7  The “values” each side espouses are intentionally presented in this schematic form. The 
intention is not to encapsulate in a simplistic definition all that it means to be on the “right” or the 
“left” of the political spectrum. The range of belief in any individual will rate on a continuum anyway; 
there is no true “right-wing person” or true “left-wing person.” This, however, plays into my main 
point, buttressing the need for a significant portion of the societal discourse to take place in the center 
where the two “sides,” such as they are, can meet. For a disturbing example of anti-centrism views, see 
Gladstone, How the Word “Centrism” Became an Insult (And Why It Should Be), PASTE MAG. (Aug. 
31, 2017), https://www.pastemagazine.com/articles/2017/08/how-the-word-centrism-became-an-
insult-and-why-it.html (“[T]here’s a very good reason so many in the growing progressive movement 
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This Note is mainly concerned with the unfortunate influence the law-
and-economics methodology is having on contemporary legal discourse 
and adjudication in the United States.8 The main drive behind my critique 
is the desirability9 of promoting legal discourse that helps ground the “true 
center” of society. This Note argues that the law-and-economics 
movement, both in its normative and descriptive applications to legal 
analysis, has significantly aided the derailment of American society from 
its “true center.” By contrast the relatively peaceful and constant 
progression towards “true center” values in Europe is not being countered 
by a judicial method of analysis predisposed to conservative values. I 
discuss several reasons for this divergence throughout the Note, pointing 
out the irony of a nominally formalist European jurisprudence that is in 
fact enacting the core values of the American legal realist agenda, while 
the law-and-economics methodology, a purported descendent of the 
                                                                                                                                    
find centrism so ethically devoid. That’s because it’s incredibly bizarre to think of centrism as a belief 
system in the first place.”). 
8  This Note does not argue that law-and-economics, by itself, has brought about the current 
state of affairs in the United States. No single phenomenon can hold that dubious honor, but it is, in 
my view, incontestable that the practice and advocacy grounded in the methodology of law-and-
economics have significantly “helped” the overall societal process of abandonment of its “true center” 
for a new “false center,” far to the “right.” These concepts will be fleshed out further throughout this 
Note. See Kaiser, infra note 9. 
9  Robert G. Kaiser, How Republicans Lost their Minds, Democrats Lost Their Souls and 
Washington Lost Its Appeal, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-republicans-lost-their-mind-democrats-lost-their-soul-
and-washington-lost-its-appeal/2014/02/28/2ef5429c-9d89-11e3-9ba6-800d1192d08b_story.html? 
(remarking on the absurdity of some of the partisan rhetoric present in Congress: “[W]hen global-
warming deniers hold forth on the floors of the House and the Senate, and numerous Republicans 
merrily denounce our moderate president as a “Socialistic dictator[.]”) (emphasis added).   
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realists, is instituting a new limiting and conservative formalism in the 
United States.  
This Note proceeds in five parts. First, in the introduction section, I 
will lay out the general state of legal commentary and adjudication looking 
at both law-and-economics in the United States and the modern European 
jurisprudence.10 Second, I will conduct a brief historical survey of the 
evolution of jurisprudence in the United States, focusing on the law-and-
economics movement’s eventual dominance of legal discourse.11 Third, a 
similar brief survey of the European history and development of 
jurisprudence will be outlined.12 In the fourth part, I will present the main 
issue driving this Note,13 and in the final section I will sketch out a few 
ways the situation I have identified may be ameliorated.14 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The law, as an influential normative social phenomenon, must 
endeavor to be impartial, so it may remain one of the principal anchors of 
a well-balanced civil society.15 I believe that most other human institutions 
can, will, and arguably should swing with the pendulum of civilization, 
thus avoiding stagnation and decay; but the practice and commentary of 
law should avoid becoming just another political tool. The proper role of 
                                                          
10  See infra Part I. 
11  See infra Part II. 
12  See infra Part III.  
13  See infra Part IV. 
14  See infra Part V. 
15  See Overview - Rule of Law, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/educational-
resources/educational-activities/overview-rule-law (last visited Nov. 20, 2018) (“There are . . . 
principles that are so important . . . that the majority has agreed not to interfere . . . . [T]he Bill of 
Rights was passed because [these principles] . . . were deemed so important that . . . not even a 
majority should be allowed to change them.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss1/9
  
 
 
 
 
2019] THE INFLUENCE OF LAW-AND-ECONOMICS 241 
 
 
 
 
legal decisions and commentaries is to provide a frictionless pivot, 
grounding society as close to the “true center” as possible, while 
preserving the constitutional16 values of the civilization in which they 
operate. 
First, contrary to this desirable goal, the Chicago School’s variant of 
law-and-economics,17an approach pioneered in the late seventies,  has 
risen to a dominant position in legal  commentary by employing a purely 
partisan approach to societal problems under the guise of an innocuous 
methodology.18 This strand of law-and-economics is presented19 as a 
                                                          
16  I use constitutional here in the sense of foundational. This concept is not necessarily limited 
only to the Constitution adopted at the founding of the United States, but, I believe, can and should be 
expanded to encompass the true Enlightenment values the Founding Fathers espoused. America is a 
child of the Enlightenment, a Western experiment in individual freedom and personal autonomy. As 
such, its practice of the law should derive its substance from these basic principles and attempt to 
approach legal issues with an eye on preserving their continued vitality in the American society of 
today. See Jacob Soll, What Do We Owe to the Enlightenment, NEW REPUBLIC (May 20, 2015), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/121837/what-do-we-owe-enlightenment (remarking that “[t]he ideas of 
the Enlightenment are going through a crisis in the very country founded on them.”). 
17  Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 
(1979) (adducing philosophical support for the establishment of a new interpretation of law-and-
economics, one that will eventually be designated as the Chicago School).  
18  See John Cassidy, Ronald Coase and the Misuse of Economics, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 3, 
2013), https://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/ronald-coase-and-the-misuse-of-economics. 
Throughout this Note, when referring to law-and-economics I will refer to this dominant strand of the 
method, the Chicago School, and more precisely to the rampant abuse of that method which has helped 
create the current skewed and polarized American political reality. This usage does not purport to 
conflate all researchers that are using economics to illuminate the law; there are a multitude of 
economists/lawyers who use their cross-disciplinary training to arrive at well-reasoned and insightful 
commentaries and decisions. These professionals are not in the crosshairs of this Note. 
19  See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business 
9th ed. 2014).  
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natural continuation of Coasean insights,20 merely a descriptive and 
rational approach that illuminates judicial decision-making and law in 
general.21 Of course, there were significant signs of the misuse of 
economics as a methodology in the law even before the Chicago School 
stepped in and “perfected” the method.22 However, it was the Chicago 
                                                          
20  See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960) (setting up the 
groundwork for law-and-economics through the Coase theorem). See also Guido Calabresi, Some 
Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale L.J. 499 (1961) (applying the incipient 
law-and-economics method to the tort field). 
21  Of course, there was a significant “right” bias in the initial approaches of Coase and 
Calabresi as well. This is evident because of their chosen starting point of analysis, the reduction of 
human behavior to economic models. But neither of these researchers advocated this new outlook as 
the only rational way of looking at the problem. On the contrary, Coase argued against such a limiting 
approach to the law and maintained only that it would be useful to also use economics to illuminate a 
legal problem. See Coase, supra note 20 at 42-44. In that limited form I believe the approach is 
extremely valuable and provides useful tools for a well-balanced legal analysis or decision. As argued 
extensively throughout this Note, however, this usage has fallen prey to a more militant approach: 
economics as the only rational way to approach a legal problem. That was not the intention of the 
founding members of the movement and it is just their epigones that have lost their way and now must 
be combated.  
22  For an early precursor to the Chicago School’s militant approach, see Garett Hardin, The 
Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). Hardin argues that a society owning land in 
common (his example is a pasture) would inevitably lead to the destruction of that commons. Id. at 
1244. As a solution, he advocates (alongside Coase for that matter) that private property should be 
implemented into that society. Id at 1248. He proceeds by first assuming that “it is to be expected that 
each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible.” Id. at 1244.  
His assumption comes from importing the homo economicus model of describing individual 
behavior. As such, the desire to maximize profit is built-in as a stock trait of all possible humans. But, 
in this hypothetical society where people own land in common, they need not necessarily be modeled 
by a commercially inclined world view. It is particularly curious that an American researcher would 
miss this empirical point, given the history of the continent. Native Americans have held in common 
their hunting grounds for close to a millennium without a “tragedy of the commons” occurring. It was 
precisely when the colonists came, with their commercial modes of being, that the hunting into near 
extinction of the buffalo occurred. This goes a long way towards proving that societies who subscribe 
to ownership in common are also likely to “breed” the type of individual that would not impose 
unnecessary externalities on his community by over-using a common resource. In a common 
ownership society, the social pressures to be a “good neighbor,” for example, can by themselves 
perform the coercive function that individual property rights attempt to perform in commercial 
societies. Even if these pressures are not formalized into law, they are sufficient to force an individual 
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School that ultimately reduced judges almost exclusively to their function 
as rational, economically minded citizens, and it described law merely as a 
mechanism for transferring commodities into higher value positions.23 As 
such, under this methodological paradigm, judges will and should apply 
the law only with a constant focus on obtaining the most efficient, and 
economically practical outcome.24 This goal is advocated as a natural and 
direct consequence of a straightforward application of the “value-neutral” 
science of economics to law controversies.25 
But, the modes of analysis that economics employs within the law, 
even if facially “value-neutral” and rational, tend both to achieve 
consistent conservative results, and, more grievously, to alter, over time 
and because of persistent use, the very landscape of legal analysis reducing 
all human interaction and conflict to actuarial tables.26 Thus, the law itself 
becomes unidimensional and is relegated to a process of “maximization of 
                                                                                                                                    
to internalize the externalities that could be brought on her community should she choose to employ a 
rapacious appropriation of communal property.   
23  See Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization Revisited, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL'Y, 85, 103 (1985). 
24  Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law 
Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 500 (1980). 
25  Id. 
26  This is a gradual process. No single misuse of economic analysis of the law can be held 
responsible for the deleterious effects on society’s discourse that this Note argues are present. 
However, there is a cumulative effect of the constant use of this methodology–to the exclusion of most 
other approaches–in legal discourse and adjudication. This effect normalizes and justifies a 
commodified version of legal discourse in areas of the law where that should not be allowed. See 
Strauss, infra note 64. 
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utility.”27 This truncated, managerial law can no longer properly perform 
its natural function of impartial mediator between different societal 
interests, since it sees all cases through the deeply distorting lens of 
economics,28 a science that has always been the handmaiden of existing 
power and privilege.29 
 Second, and by way of providing a counterpoint, the European distaste 
for an economic approach in the analysis of the law has kept the continent 
strongly in the “internal-coherence-of-the-law” camp advocated by the 
doctrinalist approach.30 Even though some inroads have been made by 
law-and-economics,31 it nevertheless remains a fringe methodology, 
sparsely used by European jurists.32 This has allowed, somehow 
surprisingly, greater flexibility in the enforcement of European laws.33 
                                                          
27  See POSNER, supra note 19; see also Thomas S. Ulen, The Unexpected Guest: Law-and-
economics, Law and Other Cognate Disciplines, and the Future of Legal Scholarship, 79 CHI.-KENT. 
L. REV. 403 (2004). 
28  See Eleanor M. Fox, The Politics of Law and Economics in Judicial Decision Making: 
Antitrust as a Window, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554, 588 (1986) (“Economic analysis . . . would pull the 
underpinnings out from [laws protecting the less powerful]. . . . [A]dvocacy of law-and-economics 
signals a preference for the established order and an ungenerosity toward those outside of the circle of 
advantage and power.”).  
29  Id. (“Since so much of the law being interpreted by the courts was designed to give a boost to 
the less advantaged, and since Americans today are so receptive to the claim that law should be 
efficient, advocacy of a generous use of law and economics sounds a political theme.”). 
30  Kristoffel R. Grechenig & Martin Gelter, The Transatlantic Divergence in Legal Thought: 
American Law and Economics vs. German Doctrinalism, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 295, 
296 (2008) [hereinafter Transatlantic Divergence]. 
31  See Ugo Mattei & Roberto Pardolesi, Law and Economics in Civil Law Countries: A 
Comparative Approach, 11 INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 265, 271-72 (1991) (inaccurately predicting that 
the law-and-economics movement in Europe is just lagging behind the United States by fifteen years, 
but that it would pick up momentum in the future). 
32  Herget & Wallace, infra note 82.  
33  See, e.g., Aernout Nieuwenhuis, Freedom of Speech: USA vs. Germany and Europe, 18 
NETH. Q. OF HUM. RTS. 195, 214 (2000) (arguing that the European laws criminalizing racist 
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This is because a European “formalist” will accept the undisputed 
prerogative of the legislature to legislate on any matter, as long as the law 
produced is harmonious with the body of law present.34 As such, if there is 
sufficient political motivation to legislate in an area, the judiciary will 
neither block nor promote that political agenda;35 it will simply endeavor 
to apply the law in a straightforward manner, while at the same time 
guarding against departures from the established jurisprudence.36 This 
European empirical reality allows their political system to effectuate “true 
center” legal solutions to actual societal problems with minimal judicial 
interference; least of all if that judicial interference, as in the United States, 
is to be done in the name of misconstrued or misapplied efficiency 
considerations.37 
                                                                                                                                    
utterances would never have been allowed in the United States because Courts would have found them 
unconstitutional). See also infra note 35.  
34  See Brian Leiter, Heidegger and the Theory of Adjudication, 106 YALE L.J. 253 (1996) 
(arguing that the European perceived formalism in judicial analysis is a restrictive view of what is in 
fact just a deferential systemic approach to the will of the legislative body). 
35  See Judgment Days, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 26, 2009), 
http://www.economist.com/node/13376204 (remarking on the significant power the German 
Constitutional Court has within its system, and the legislative deference with which that institution 
chooses to exercise that power).  
36  Leiter, supra note 34. 
37  The problem is one of institutional competence as well as democratic accountability. First, in 
passing a law Congress should not have to worry about a judge balancing the economic impact of that 
law against the perceived benefits. This should be fundamental since the judge will inevitably have a 
personal opinion on what constitutes a societal benefit or a cost. But, it is not the judge’s place to make 
that final determination; the elected representatives of the people hold that right. Second, if elected 
officials promote a bad, or even inefficient law, they are always accountable to their constituents, and 
subject to the judgment of the court of public opinion. Not so in the case of federal judges, even when 
they purport to interpret the law through the supposedly “value-neutral” lens of economic theory. 
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II. A BRIEF LEGAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
FOCUSING ON LAW-AND-ECONOMICS 
At its core, the United States legal tradition is conservative and 
formalist.38 Formalism can be both a descriptive way of looking at 
adjudication and a normative way of prescribing what adjudication should 
do.39 In both instances, however, the focus is always on the independence 
of the legal system from coordinated branches of government.40 In a 
purely descriptive sense, formalists believe that judges should reach 
decisions exclusively by discerning the applicable principles of law and 
applying them to the facts before them.41 This restrictive view of the law 
                                                                                                                                    
It is deeply ironic, and evoking of Orwellian doublespeak, when we find staunch conservatives, 
always sounding the alarm bell against activist judges, now praising law-and-economics, which 
legitimates precisely a judge’s right to interfere with the democratic process in the name of efficiency 
considerations. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. V. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (joint opinion of 
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ.) (discussing costs and incentives in insurance markets in 
arguing that the Affordable Care Act’s Individual Mandate is not permissible under the Commerce 
Clause). It is beyond the scope of this Note to analyze the extent to which judges, as a group, even 
understand economics as applied to, for example, disfavored categories of citizenry. However, the 
rational actor model has been sufficiently critiqued for this Note to just simply remark that this model 
does not apply to all categories of persons, and that it has serious limitations when dealing with many 
particular cases. See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER, MISBEHAVING: THE MAKING OF BEHAVIORAL 
ECONOMICS (2015); see also Transatlantic Divergence, supra note 30.  
38  ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 25 (Amy Gutmann ed. 1997) (“[Even 
when a murderer has been caught red-handed] [w]e nonetheless insist that . . . the state . . . must 
conduct a full-dress criminal trial that results in a verdict of guilty. . . . It is what makes us a 
government of laws and not of men.”). 
39  See Steven M. Quvedo, Formalist and Instrumental Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, 73 
CAL. L. REV. 119 (1985) (providing an overview of the legal realist instrumentalist “attack” on the 
formalist deontological values). See also Charles C. Goetsch, The Future of Legal Formalism, 24 AM. 
U.  J. OF LEGAL HIST.  221 (1980) (arguing that legal formalism was not simply a conservative tool but 
a way to perceive the law as self-sufficient). 
40  See, e.g., MASS. CONST. art. XXX (providing that the judiciary “shall never exercise the 
legislative and executive powers, or either of them; to the end [that Massachusetts’ government] may 
be a government of laws, and not of men.”).  
41  Brian Leiter, Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What Is the Issue? (Univ. of Chi. Pub. 
Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 320, 2010). See also CESARE BONESANA DI BECCARIA, AN 
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that does not allow for extraneous factors to be a part of a proper law 
analysis is now supposedly extinct. However, a nuanced version of 
formalism is strongly present in the writings of many U.S. judges and 
scholars,42 a fact that explains the ease with which conservative jurists 
have accepted the supremacy of economic analysis in the law.43 These 
jurists have just substituted one type of formalism — law as a self-
sufficient social phenomenon — with another — law that is best explained 
and practiced exclusively through the lens of economics.44  
As such, part of this Note’s argument is that economic analysis of the 
law has now reached a formalist prevalence, both in substance and in its 
dominance of the American judicial commentary and adjudication.45 
                                                                                                                                    
ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (W.C. Little & Co. 1872) (1764) (attempting to reduce the 
analysis of criminal law to a mechanistic, formal and rational application of the legal rules); RONALD 
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 217 (Harvard Univ. Press ed. 1986). 
42  See DWORKIN, supra note 41, at 218-19 (1986). See also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 
U.S. 1, 56 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“It is our task . . . not to enter 
the minds of the Members of Congress - who need have nothing in mind . . . - but rather to give fair 
and reasonable meaning to the text of the United States Code, adopted by various Congresses at 
various times.”).  
43  See Kronman, infra note 57.  
44  David Lyons, Legal Formalism and Instrumentalism—A Pathological Study, 66 CORNELL L. 
REV. 949 (1981) (arguing that formalists and instrumentalists share a common baseline of 
understanding of what law is, or should be; but, that the latter merely go one step further by looking 
outside the law for other sources of explanatory and decisional power while the former maintain the 
sufficiency of law, by itself, to explain all legal processes. This familial similarity explains why the 
law-and-economics method–a strand of the legal realist, instrumentalist movement–has easily derailed 
into a formalistic practice by applying a one-size-fits-all analysis grounded in efficiency 
considerations). 
45  See Kronman, infra note 57.  
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Advocates of this approach consistently deny any possible flaw in the 
application of economics to the law, maintaining that it should almost 
always be a fundamental part of a legal analysis and that to deny its 
primacy would be an irrational way to approach a legal problem.46 The 
belief is that without an economic underpinning, any legal decision 
becomes unfounded at best, and most likely even harmful to the interests 
advanced.47 This type of absolutist faith in one’s method is curious 
considering the supposed, and often flaunted, “value-neutral” nature of the 
methodology.48 It is also eerily similar to the formalist belief in the 
existence of a priori principles of the law that will inevitably dictate the 
outcome of all controversies, with the noted difference that law should 
apparently now bow to neo-classical price theory, or individual behavior 
driven by object scarcity, and other assumptions present in liberal 
economics.49 
To return to the historical evolution, the formalist theory of old was 
prevalent and universally accepted, at least at the level of theoretical 
explanations of adjudicating, until the “realist” challenge of the 1920s.50 
                                                          
46  See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Inevitability of Law and Economics, 1 LEGAL EDUC. REV. 3, 3 
(1989) (“If there is scarcity, law cannot be understood apart from economic thought. Neither teaching 
nor practice nor judging can disregard the subject.”). 
47  Id. at 4-5 (“Decisions based on falsehoods . . . will not achieve the purposes their authors had 
in mind . . . Without [law-and-economics], we shall be unable to achieve our objectives or understand 
the consequences of the rules other people propose. In this sense economic analysis is inevitable.”) 
(emphasis added). 
48  Francesco Parisi & Jonathan Klick, Functional Law and Economics: The Search for Value-
Neutral Principles of Lawmaking, (Apr. 14, 2004) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Penn Law: 
Legal Scholarship Repository, Faculty Scholarship Paper 1131) (“Functional law and economics 
avoids paternalism and methodological imperialism by formulating value-neutral principles of 
collective choice.”).  
49  See generally POSNER, supra note 19. Judge Posner has sustained these restrictive views on 
the role of economics in the law in most all of his publications on the issue. 
50  See Leiter, supra note 41, at 7 . 
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The realists saw the judicial process as being highly influenced by other-
than-legal considerations.51 In the works of Jerome Frank, Herman 
Oliphant, and Karl Llewellyn, to name a few, the adjudication process was 
viewed as indeterminate, especially in the cases that reached appellate 
review.52 This was so because these cases were usually not straight-
forward decisions that could be based exclusively on a clear reading of 
law.53 The realists contended, thus, that judges cannot be truly impartial 
because they would habitually import their own normative considerations 
into the adjudication process.54  
For the purpose of this Note, it is sufficient to remark that “we are all 
realists now.”55 The realists have dominated legal analysis in the United 
States for a considerable amount of time. Within this approach, the law-
and-economics movement has evolved to a dominant position in both legal 
commentary and adjudication practice.56 The dominance of the law-and-
                                                          
51  Id. at 12. 
52  Id. at 3. In these theorists’ views, the word “indeterminate” meant that most, if not all, cases 
that reach appellate review cannot be properly decided by a straightforward appeal to legal rules. As 
such, they contended, judges will import conscious or unconscious personal biases into adjudication. 
The Realists differed when discussing the extent of this phenomenon, but this Note will not delve into 
those differences.   
53  Id. at 2. 
54  Id. at 3.  
55  Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 467 (1988). 
56  Bruce Ackerman, Law, Economics, and the Problem of Legal Culture, 1986 DUKE L.  J. 929, 
929-30 (1986) (arguing that there are two distinct law-and-economics schools: the Chicago School, 
which holds that “the only appropriate forms of legal argument are those that can be cast in a way that 
is acceptable to economists;” and the Yale Law School, which advocates the “integrat[ion] [of] 
distinctive grammar of law and economics into traditional forms of legal discourse, producing a richer 
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economics approach has been an accepted fact for more than thirty-five 
years, even by critics of the method.57  
As previously mentioned, this approach had its beginnings in the 
1960s.58 Later, the scholars from the Chicago School have altered the 
initial positions of Coase and Calabresi, who both advocated a mostly 
value-neutral methodological approach to law by using the tools of 
economics.59 Thus, in a significant departure from the initial Coase model, 
modern-day economic analysis of the law, for example, assumes as a 
given empirical truth what Coase had postulated only as a theoretical 
model: the lack of transaction costs.60 Coase himself has decried this 
narrow interpretation of his theory, stating that his theory was meant as a 
catalyst for further theoretical research into the use of economic principles 
in the analysis of the law, not as an axiom that advocates free market 
laissez-faire economics.61  
                                                                                                                                    
conception of appropriate legal argument.”). The distinction between the two “schools of law and 
economics” has been since blurred, to the total domination of the “imperialistic” approach of the 
Chicago School. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.  
57  Anthony T. Kronman, The Second Driker Forum for Excellence in the Law, 42 WAYNE L. 
REV. 115, 160 (1995) (“The law-and-economics movement was and continues to be an enormous 
enlivening force in American legal thought and, I would say, today continues and remains the single 
most influential jurisprudential school in this country.”). 
58  See Coase, supra note 20; See Calabresi, supra note 20. 
59  See Coase, supra note 20; See Calabresi, supra note 20.  
60  Based on this warping of the Coase theorem, conservative judicial activists, led by the 
Chicago School, have led the laissez-faire, deregulation revolution, while arguably giving the world 
the 2008 recession in the process. There is significant research on the excesses of the unregulated 
market to warrant at the very least a skeptical attitude towards a purely economic approach to legal 
problems. See Douglas C. North, The New Institutional Economics, 142 J. OF INSTITUTIONAL & 
THEORETICAL ECON. 230 (1986) (arguing that a proper understanding of economic theory requires a 
significant investigation into the empirical situation of the actors involved, including the transaction 
costs associated with their interactions). 
61  See Kaiser, supra note 9.  
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Supporters of the Chicago School approach will sometimes reply that 
applications of the economic analysis to the law that are blind to 
surrounding empirical realities are just poorly done, and do not represent 
the ideal way of using the method.62 However, it is the reality of more than 
thirty-five years of dominant application of this method which is relevant, 
not the supposedly benign intentions of the Chicago School scholars. The 
effect belies the intent. Empirically, in most cases, economic analysis of 
the law is being used as a powerful tool of polarization with a strong 
conservative bias.63 True adherents to the law-and-economics method are 
supposed to be inveterate empiricists, and, as such, they should look at the 
actual cumulative effects of their method in action, not hide under the 
supposed purity and rationality of economic analysis of the law, as applied 
in a vacuum or behind university doors.  
In its present militant and formalist form, economic analysis of the law 
has become the dominant conservative jurisprudential tool. It has the 
power to constantly influence judicial thought and lawyer behavior in all 
aspects of the law.64 This influence helps to exacerbate the “right” shift 
                                                          
62  See Easterbrook, supra note 46, at 28 (“[E]conomics is not an addition to law, a strange 
outside force. Economics is an integral part of the study of legal rules and the rule-making process. 
The only question is whether we do this well or poorly.”) (emphasis added). 
63  See Mark Thoma, There’s a Conservative Bias in Economics, THE WEEK (June 25, 2016), 
http://theweek.com/articles/631010/theres-conservative-bias-economics (“The conservative bias in 
economics begins with the baseline theoretical model, what is often called ‘Economics 101.’ This 
model of perfect competition describes a world that agrees with Republican ideology. In this model, 
there is no role for government intervention in the economy beyond setting the institutional structure 
for free markets to operate. There is nothing government can do to improve the ability of market to 
provide the goods and services people desire at the lowest possible price, or to help markets respond to 
shocks.”) (emphasis added). 
64  See, e.g, David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in 
Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO.  L. J. 1619, 1620 (1991) (analyzing a precise 
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from a “true center” to a “false center” that American society has been 
experiencing for the last forty years. Nevertheless, the issue is not 
necessarily this pendulum swing, but the fact that  law-and-economics is 
legitimizing this new “false center” by defending the use of economics in 
the law as just a baseline, scientific tool, and maintaining that theorists 
who subscribe to the method are merely apostles of rationality.65 The fact 
that modern law-and-economics scholars and judges do not explicitly state 
their conservative bias is perhaps their most egregious fault. This is so 
because by pretending, or even honestly believing in some cases, that they 
are just applying a “value-neutral” method of legal analysis, they deprive 
their natural opponents—scholars and judges who believe in procedural 
rights, for example—of the opportunity to engage them, and to eventually 
balance the jurisprudential field through communication between the 
opposing camps. This dialogue would have the beneficial effect of 
returning legal analysis, and with it in time the entire legal profession, 
closer to its natural habitat, the “true center” of society.66 
                                                                                                                                    
example of the law-and-economics approach’s overapplication, in the case of the corporate lawyers’ 
tactics in civil rights litigation after the 1980s.)  
These corporate lawyers would habitually bring their efficiency-oriented modes of analysis from 
commercial disputes into cases involving civil rights violations. This led to a process of 
commodification of social justice. In turn, this affected the underlying social contract because large 
segments of society no longer felt like they had a stake in the “American Dream.” Thus, society 
became less cooperative at all levels of interaction. This effect is contrary to the fundamental societal 
purpose of promoting synergy; if we wanted a zero-sum game, pure anarchy would be more efficient. 
See also David Dayen, Corporate-Funded Judicial Boot Camp Made Sitting Federal Judges More 
Conservative, THE INTERCEPT (October 23, 2018) https://theintercept.com/2018/10/23/federal-
judiciary-henry-manne-law-economics/ (describing a law-and-economics training program for judges 
and remarking that “[b]y introducing to federal judges what appeared to be a neutral method to 
organize and understand the law, [the program’s organizer] was able to significantly shift the way law 
is now practiced.”). 
65  Parisi & Klick, supra note 47; POSNER, supra note 19; Easterbrook, supra note 46. 
66  It would probably even suffice if legal analysis and adjudication would simply refrain from 
helping the right swing of societal discourse. It is not necessary for the law to help “the other side,” 
and embrace, for example, the postulates of critical legal studies. It would suffice if legal analysis and 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss1/9
  
 
 
 
 
2019] THE INFLUENCE OF LAW-AND-ECONOMICS 253 
 
 
 
 
At its core, law-and-economics is sustained by an explicit assumption 
that all individuals are rational economic actors, who invariably will 
behave in a predictable manner because they will always seek to maximize 
personal utility.67 Starting from this ideological presupposition, the 
economic analysis of the law proceeds to apply economic rules in a 
supposedly “value-neutral” way to the entirety of legal human interaction, 
from family to constitutional law.68 Leaving aside the impossibility of any 
methodology to actually reach a “value-neutral” perspective,69 the laws of 
economics being used are uniquely unsuited for this designation. The 
science of economics is laden with classical liberal thought and subscribes 
to a limiting view of property rights, anchored in exclusive individualism. 
                                                                                                                                    
adjudication would resume its natural position of impartial arbiter and allow the American society to 
gradually balance out the right-wing position it finds itself in. The main point of this Note was not to 
advocate for a partisan swing, but to illuminate the deleterious effects a partisan approach to law will 
have, and is having, on the society in which it operates. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Third Pillar of 
Jurisprudence: Social Legal Theory, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2235 (2015) (arguing that the modern 
jurisprudential landscape should not be limited to a simple dichotomy between natural law and legal 
positivism; but that it should include a “third pillar,” social legal theory, which is a balanced approach 
between these two extremes, one that is sensitive to the surrounding historical context in which law 
operates but also mindful of maintaining the internal coherence and purpose of the law itself).  
67  See generally POSNER, supra note 19. 
68  Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L. REV. 757, 759 (1975) (“The 
hallmark of the ‘new’ law and economics is the application of the theories and empirical methods of 
economics to the central institutions of the legal system . . . . Whereas the ‘old’ law and economics 
confined its attention to laws governing explicit economic relationships, and indeed to a quite limited 
subset of such laws (the law of contracts, for example, was omitted). The ‘new’ law and economics 
recognizes no such limitation on the domain of economic analysis of the law.”) (emphasis added). 
69  See generally EMILE DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD (W.D. Halls, trans., 
Steven Lukes, ed., The Free Press 1982) (1895) (arguing that there is no possible impartial 
methodology, and that, at most, a researcher can minimize his input into the researched problem by 
maintaining a formalistic separation between his personality and his hypotheses). 
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In a nutshell, the economic paradigm that is being used by the law-and-
economics scholars is far from “value-neutral,” and while it is treated as 
rationally axiomatic, it reflects a strong initial ideological choice.70  
Because of these underlying assumptions and presumed axioms, the 
application of economics to the law should always be tempered by a 
holistic view of the case in controversy using a broader array of 
methodological tools.71 This point has been convincingly and exhaustively 
argued by Professor Laurence Tribe.72 In his efforts to comprehensively 
reply to Professor Easterbrook, Professor Tribe correctly argues that the 
utilitarian approach of law-and-economics is constitutively incapable of 
providing proper guidance to legal decision making, especially at the 
Supreme Court level.73 Ultimately, this is because utilitarian views cannot 
contain any discourse about values, they are by their very nature incapable 
                                                          
70  See Thoma, supra note 63. See also Morton J. Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or 
Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 905-06 (1980) (identifying the “systematic bias of Chicago law-
and-economics favoring the [economic] status quo.”). Professor Horwitz’ critique of the incipient 
Chicago School is valuable in its entirety, even if it prematurely prognosticated its demise: “I have the 
strong feeling that the economic analysis of law has ‘peaked out’ as the latest fad . . . . Future legal 
historians will need to exercise their imaginations to figure out why so many people could have taken 
most of this stuff so seriously.” Id. at 905. 
71  This point has been conceded by one of the preeminent advocates of law-and-economics, 
Frank Easterbrook, in his polemic with Laurence Tribe. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Method, Result, 
and Authority: A Reply, 98 HARV. L. REV. 622, 623 (1985) (agreeing with Professor Tribe that not all 
disputes should be governed by utilitarian principles; “[professor Tribe] believes . . . that many human 
concerns cannot be (or ought not to be) monetized . . . and that the Constitution often instructs judges 
to disregard utilitarian calculations in favor of recognizing personal rights and reshaping preferences. I 
am delighted to agree.”). 
72  See Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 592, 595 (1985) [hereinafter Constitutional Calculus] (“Contrary to Professor 
Easterbrook's assumption, the constitutional decisions of courts . . . serve not merely to implement 
‘given’ systems of acknowledged values, but also to define and reshape the values - indeed, the very 
identity - of the nation.”). 
73  Id. (“[The Supreme Court] not only chooses how to achieve preexisting ends, but also affects 
what those ends are to be and who we are to become.”). 
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of providing answers to any “oughts.”74 Owing to its structural 
shortcomings, law-and-economics should not drive the discourse in legal 
analysis and adjudication; it is simply not the proper tool for the job.75 
III. A SCHEMATIC OUTLINE OF EUROPEAN LEGAL 
HISTORY AS A USEFUL COUNTERPOINT 
Europe is the birthplace of both dominant forms of legal systems; the 
Roman Empire through the Justinian Code inspiring the civil system and 
the British Empire through the system of writs promoting the common 
law.76 Europe has also long been a divided place, not only geographically 
by nations, but also in its nations’ legal traditions.77 There are several 
                                                          
74  Id. at 596 (“The appeal of utilitarian policy analysis, as well as its power, lies in its ability to 
reduce the various dimensions of a problem to a common denominator. The inevitable result is not 
only that ‘soft’ variables . . . tend to be ignored or understated, but also that entire problems are 
reduced to terms that misstate their structure and that ignore the nuances that give these problems their 
full character. . . . Being ‘assigned’ a right on efficiency grounds, after an appraisal of the relevant cost 
curves, hardly satisfies the particular human need that can be met only by a shared social and legal 
understanding that the right belongs to the individual because the capacity and opportunity it embodies 
are organically and historically a part of the person that she is, and not for any purely contingent and 
essentially managerial reason. As Justice Stewart concisely put the matter . . . ‘Personal liberties are 
not rooted in the law of averages.’”) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
75  Id. 
76  See generally BART WAUTERS & MARCO DE BENITO, THE HISTORY OF LAW IN EUROPE, AN 
INTRODUCTION (2017), https://www.e-elgar.com/shop/eep/preview/book/isbn/9781786430762/; see 
also Thomas Plucknett, The Conquest and “Domesday Book” through Henry I’s Reforms, in A 
CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 11, 11-16 (2010), http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/plucknett-a-
concise-history-of-the-common-law. 
77  The Common Law and Civil Law Traditions, THE ROBBINS COLLECTION,  
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/library/robbins/CommonLawCivilLawTraditions.html (last visited Nov. 
23, 2018). 
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distinct civil law traditions within Europe, most notably those of France, 
Germany, and Scandinavia. The civil law, in general, is derived from “ius 
civile, the law applicable to all Roman cives or citizens.”78 In the Middle 
Ages, most of western Europe developed a common system of law 
founded on the Justinian Code that “was taught at most universities and 
formed the basis of a shared body of legal thought.”79 This initial 
uniformity of law and custom provided a solid foundation for the current 
attempt at integration through the European Union. In the interim, 
however, the aspirations of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment 
produced different legal codes in the dominant European continental states 
of the time.80 These codes are now the model for most of the world’s civil 
codes. 
The legal scholars and judges of contemporary Europe generally 
adhere to a legal positivist approach to the law.81 But this has not always 
been the case, as evidenced by the existence of the “free law movement” 
in Germany,82 with a “central period” between 1899 and 1912.83 Of 
                                                          
78  Id.  
79  Id. ( “The birth and evolution of the medieval civil law tradition based on Roman law was 
thus integral to European legal development. It offered a store of legal principles and rules invested 
with the authority of ancient Rome . . . [allowing] a comprehensive legal code [that provides] 
substantive and procedural law . . . .”). 
80  Id. (citing the 1786 Code of Joseph II and Complete Civil Code of 1811; the 1794 Complete 
Territorial Code in Prussia; and the 1804 Civil Code in France, which is also known as the Napoleonic 
Code).  
81  See Transatlantic Divergence, supra note 30, at 303 (“[L]egal positivism, understood as strict 
adherence to positive law to the exclusion of any substantive justification of norms, caused legal 
scholarship to dissociate from other disciplines.”). 
82  James E. Herget & Stephen Wallace, The German Free Law Movement as the Source of 
American Legal Realism, 73 VA.  L. REV. 399, 421-28 (1987) (arguing that one of the sources for 
American legal realism was the free law movement from Germany and drawing attention to the 
crosspollination of academic ideas across the Atlantic between legal scholars in late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries). 
83  Id. at 402. 
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course, all schools of jurisprudence were represented in European legal 
analysis in the late nineteenth century.84 However, in the end, legal 
positivism won the debate, owing its victory to the strong social 
circumstances favoring a clear separation of powers—the spirit of the age, 
and perhaps of the land, required that law be law and nothing else. As 
such, in true positivist fashion, “law [was identified] in a manner that 
would clearly separate it from the morality with which it had been 
‘confused.’”85 This approach helped to define law “as those commands or 
norms that emanate[] from the state.”86  
This purely deferential view of the law in the face of legislative will is 
fundamental to the understanding of contemporary European 
jurisprudence. However, and more salient to this Note’s inquiry, the 
European jurisprudence is not entirely positivist; the strong and respected 
“historical school” has influenced and added nuance to the European legal 
scholarship.87 Savigny, the originator of this school, and his ideas of the 
                                                          
84  Three main schools of jurisprudential thought existed at that time. First, there were followers 
of a “historical school” represented mainly by Savigny, and in the company of intellectual 
powerhouses like Hegel and Darwin. Second, the natural law school was also strongly represented, and 
advocates of that perspective, heavily influenced by Thomas Aquinas, were mostly centered around 
Catholic universities. Lastly, the analytical school, or the legal positivist school existed as well. This 
latter school of thought ended up dominating European jurisprudence. See Transatlantic Divergence, 
supra note 30, at 296. 
85  Herget & Wallace, supra note 82, at 404.  
86  Id. (“Thus, in the positivist view the paradigm of law was legislation.”). 
87  Id. at 406-407 (“[T]he fusion that enactment of [the German law code] brought about 
between the competing schools of thought resulted in a relatively standardized and authoritative 
approach to the [origin of law] problem.”). 
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Volksgeist,88 the spirit of the people from which law emanates, are strongly 
present both in the national pride systems with their internal laws89 and in 
the structures of the European Union.90  
In any case, it can convincingly be said that the strong European 
tradition favoring a high level of formalism has never been dethroned, at 
least not in the manner that the American legal realists envisioned and 
realized in the United States. Interestingly, the United Kingdom also 
adheres to the European formalist tradition even though it shares the 
common law system with the United States.91 The majority of modern 
European legal scholars assume the field of law to be a distinct area of 
inquiry, with its own methodological tools,92 and they analyze judicial 
decisions and proposed new legislation by inquiring into their internal 
consistency with the entire body of law.93 Even in the United Kingdom, 
                                                          
88  For an interesting comparison between Savigny’s idea of possession with Holmes’s and the 
law-and-economics approach, see Richard A. Posner, Savigny, Holmes, and the Law and Economics of 
Possession, 86 VA. L. REV. 535 (2000) (finding that both Savigny and Holmes were wrong, and that 
(surprise!) law-and-economics can always explain possession better). 
89  As an example, the French will always see their 1789 Declaration of Human and Civic 
Rights as foundational to the whole of modern western civilization. Similarly, the Germans see their 
tradition within the law as ancient and venerable, as well as the only tradition that kept intact the spirit 
of Roman law, through the age of the Germanic Holy Roman Empire. 
90  The Institution: General Presentation, CT. OF JUST. OF THE EUR. UNION, 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/T5_5119/en/ (noting that the Court of Justice of the European Union 
ensures uniform interpretation of the laws of the European Union throughout the member states). 
91  See Transatlantic Divergence, supra note 30, at 303 (“Admittedly, law and economics have 
made some inroads in the U.K., notably in corporate law, but as a whole, scholarly work based upon 
black-letter law continues to predominate as it does on the European continent. External or critical 
perspectives seem to remain marginal as they do in continental Europe.”); see also Neil Duxbury, 
When Trying is Failing: Holmes’s “Englishness,” 63 BROOK. L. J. 145, 146 (1997). 
92  In other words, they are legal positivists. 
93  See Transatlantic Divergence, supra note 30, at 295-96 (“[In Europe] [l]aw is typically 
viewed ‘from the inside,’ that is as an autonomous discipline independent from the other social 
sciences. Most legal scholarship is doctrinal, meaning that legal scholars employ interpretative 
methods in order to systematically expose the law and to find out what the law is, frequently even 
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most legal commentators will look at the common law with a much stricter 
deference, allowing for limited flexibility in the system, in contrast to the 
comparatively pragmatic American approach.94 As such, the existence of a 
common law system, as opposed to a civil one, seems not to be the 
distinguishing principle that allowed for the realist approach to flourish.95 
Thus, a different limiting principle must be found.  
A strong candidate explaining the existence of this divergence in 
approaches between the United States and Europe is the former’s legal 
scholars’ predisposition toward utilitarian and pragmatic modes of 
analysis.96 While utilitarian approaches need not entail a total lack of 
                                                                                                                                    
before it is tackled by a court. U.S.-style legal scholarship is often considered very alien, and law and 
economics in particular often meets outright rejection.”). 
94  Even though the United States and the United Kingdom share a common system of laws, the 
British evolution of the common law has ossified their precedents to a larger degree than in the 
relatively young American jurisprudence. This fact, coupled with probable differences in national 
character, have led to a significant variance in the way judicial commentators treat precedent. While in 
the United Kingdom, most legal scholars will look at precedent as having almost the force of written 
law (similar to a civil system), in the United States, while stare decisis is still given significant weight, 
the flexibility and innate pragmatism of the American judicial mindset seems to favor a faster change 
in the rules. A deeper analysis of these differences is, however, not within the scope of this Note. For a 
fascinating and insightful dialogue on the topic between Justice Ginsburg and Lord Hale, see British 
and U.S. Legal Systems, C-SPAN (Jan. 24, 2008), https://www.c-span.org/video/?202885-1/british-us-
legal-systems. 
95  See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 138-44 (Oxford Univ. Press 1961). 
96  See, e.g., Beanstalk Group, Inc. v. AM Gen. Corp., 283 F.3d 856, 860 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(Posner, J). (“One must know something about the practical as well as the purely verbal context of the 
language to be interpreted. This doesn't mean that judges should have an M.B.A . . . but merely that 
they be alert citizens of a market-oriented society so that they can recognize absurdity . . . .”) 
(emphasis added). 
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sensibility to issues of distributive justice,97 the modern law-and-
economics approach in practice does tend to ignore these issues.98 As such, 
while in Europe legal scholars would try to determine what is “right,” in 
the United States often the question would be recast into what is 
“expedient” or, more recently, as this Note remarks, what is most 
“efficient.”99 
In conclusion, because efficiency was not (and is still not) considered a 
highly relevant consideration in a proper legal analysis, let alone the only 
consideration as in the law-and-economics method, European 
jurisprudence and adjudication has remained largely unaffected by the 
law-and-economics revolution.100 Because of this factual state of affairs, 
                                                          
97  See, e.g., PAUL J. KELLY, UTILITARIANISM AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE – JEREMY BENTHAM 
AND THE CIVIL LAW (1990) (attempting to remove Bentham’s philosophy from the vulgar 
oversimplification of utility maximization that many purported followers erroneously insist he was 
advocating).  
98  See Constitutional Calculus, supra note 72, at 594-95 (“Professor Easterbrook tells us that 
what we need to ask is what effect the alternative rules will have on the future behavior of individuals; 
but he does not bother to inquire how those same alternatives will affect the future distribution of 
power and wealth among those individuals, nor does he care to know how the parties actually before 
the court initially arrived at their unequal positions. This disregard of the distributional dimension of 
any given problem is characteristic of the entire law-and-economics school of thought, which assumes 
a world in which no one is economically coerced and in which individuals who do not ‘buy’ things are 
said to be ‘unwilling,’ rather than unable, to do so.”) (emphasis added). 
99  This tendency can best be explained by the philosophical differences in approaches to moral 
theory. While European scholars (especially on the continent) mostly subscribe to the 
Kantian/deontological view of morality and law, the United States has a significant bend toward 
utilitarian approaches. This difference in views goes a long way in explaining the ease with which law-
and-economics has conquered the American legal landscape, becoming the new formalism; and 
conversely, it also explains to a significant extent why it probably will never have the same impact in 
Europe. See Transatlantic Divergence, supra note 30.  
100 See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Carmen L. Brun, Lost in Translation: The Economic 
Analysis of Law in the United States and Europe, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 602, 620 (2006); 
Nuno Garoupa & Thomas S. Ulen, The Market for Legal Innovation: Law and Economics in Europe 
and the United States (Mar. 22, 2007) (Ill. Law & Econ. Working Papers Series, Research Paper No. 
LE07-009), https://ssrn.com/abstract=972360; but cf. Heikki Pihlajamaki, Against Metaphysics in 
Law: The Historical Background of American and Scandinavian Legal Realism Compared, 52 AM. J. 
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the legal landscape in Europe is mostly conservative from the perspective 
of methodology (positivist) but also purely deferential to the legislature 
and thus progressive in effect.101 As such, European formalism is in fact 
achieving far more of the substantial aims of proponents of American legal 
realism,102 in contrast to their purported direct descendants, adherents to 
the law-and-economics movement, which are locking the American 
jurisprudence in a new dogmatic, formalist, and conservative approach.103  
IV. THE ISSUE 
The center of American civil society and political discourse has 
experienced a significant shift beginning with the neoliberal counter-
revolution of the late 1970s. Social mores and attitudes are, to be sure, 
                                                                                                                                    
COMP. L. 469 (2004) (remarking that the Scandinavian legal tradition has a flourishing legal realist 
school, as does the United States).  
101 See infra Part IV. 
102 See ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW (1921); see also KARL LLEWELLYN, 
THE BRAMBLE BUSH 109-21 (1930).  
103 Ironically, the law-and-economics movement traces its lineage primarily to Jeremy Bentham. 
Bentham was an initial proponent of using law as a tool of achieving the greater good for the greatest 
number of people in society, a true legal realist agenda. While the idea of economic efficiency being a 
fundamental concern for adjudication so that it may  enhance the aggregate wealth of society is easy to 
defend, the fact that the wealth of society, its overall capital, is conflated with the greater good is not. 
Bentham himself was far more nuanced on the topic, his famous formulation of the greater good being 
the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people. He advocated criminal reform, for example, 
while the law-and-economics scholars will do away with the protections of the 5th Amendment on 
grounds of inefficiency. It is perhaps time for law-and-economics to at least choose another patron 
saint if they wish to proceed as they have. See Frederick N. Judson, A Modern View of the Law 
Reforms of Jeremy Bentham, 10 COLUM. L. REV. 41 (1910); see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, The 
Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 470-71 (1897) (arguing that the purpose of the law is the 
deterrence of undesirable social consequences). 
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always in flux, and there is no need for alarm if the variance is within 
accepted parameters. But the erosion of public trust and polarization of 
political beliefs currently experienced in the United States is a strong 
indicator that we are most likely outside the “temperate zone.” This radical 
“right” shift can be traced to multiple factors that mostly have their roots 
in the strong counter-reaction of 1970s and 1980s conservatives to what 
they perceived as social challenges, by the previous generation, against the 
status quo of power and privilege.104 Among their tools, and often playing 
the role of main instigators, the Chicago School scholars, using their 
influence on legal commentary, substantially contributed to the 
deregulatory reform, by skewing to the “right” the jurisprudential 
approach in almost all areas of the law, and providing the ammunition for 
the free market, anti-big-government activists.  
The Chicago School of legal interpretation subscribes to a limiting 
interpretation of all human interaction using only the polarizing lens of 
efficiency. One of the most common protestations of law-and-economics 
scholars is, however, that critics fail to distinguish between positive law-
and-economics, which only describes a legal controversy using 
economics, and normative law-and-economics, which advocates for 
change in the law by using the tools of economics.105 Essentially, the 
argument goes, we should not conflate the person who employs economics 
as an explanatory tool with someone who uses it for social engineering. I 
                                                          
104 See Thomas O. McGarity, Regulatory Reform in the Reagan Era, 45 Md. L. Rev. 253, 254 
(1986) (“Government power, not private power, is the concern of these new reformers. ‘Freedom,’ 
‘accountability,’ ‘efficiency,’ and ‘economic growth’ are the dominant themes. The regulatory 
agencies that were once the temples of the earlier social reform movements have become the targets of 
the modern ‘regulatory reform’ movement.”)  McGarity astutely remarks that this new movement 
developed as a “response to perceived weaknesses in the regulatory process as it had evolved through 
the years.” Id. In short, the conservatives were hitting back at what they perceived as a governmental 
overextension into areas that in their view should be left solely to the play of the markets–perhaps 
areas like civil rights or environmental regulation. 
105 See Richard A. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 
284-85 (1979). 
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fail to see any practical distinction for this sophistry to be relevant; when 
writing a judicial commentary or arriving at a decision as a judge, if a 
person employs economics as its main tool, the results that person will 
obtain will inevitably be circumscribed by the tool being used. As such, 
even if that person does not set out to “change the world” and merely 
wants to describe it, by using economics exclusively and forgetting to 
balance it out with true legal analysis grounded in values, the empirical 
effect will be indistinguishable: the social engineering will take place by 
force of repetition. Hiding behind benign intentions does not change the 
empirical results. 
Moreover, efficiency, as a concept, is always going to favor 
distributive paradigms that help the financially affluent and reinforce 
existing power structures. This is just in the nature of the concept itself 
and it has no possibility of self-balancing; that is why, before law-and-
economics dominated legal discourse, arguments presented in briefs that 
extolled the ex ante efficiency benefits of an advocated course of action 
attempted to balance that efficiency angle with other strong policy, rights, 
and value-related arguments. The mechanical, ruthless way in which 
economic laws function is precisely why their application to legal issues 
will always be insufficient. This is why economics is economics—and it 
functions splendidly when faced with commercial problems and 
maximization of capital returns. Conversely, law is law, and it has its basis 
in human and ethical values, as reflected in the Bill of Rights and the 
Constitution, that should not be nickeled-and-dimed out of our 
jurisprudence. Human controversies require a humanistic perspective in 
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their resolution to avoid promoting a society made of people/objects106 
who just transact things/objects.107  
Because of this efficiency-only approach, modern day law-and-
economics is helping to swing the pendulum toward the “right” of the 
political spectrum, transforming the law itself from the anchor of our 
social system into a political tool that legitimizes a new “false center.”108 
Consequently, by failing in its role as a neutral force impartial and 
immune to political bias, the law as advocated by the contemporary law-
and-economics approach helps the neoliberal counter-revolution 
commodify most aspects of our lives and foster a generation of corporate 
consumers bereft of traditional notions of liberty and autonomy.109 
By contrast, in Europe the process of integration has helped to propel 
the values of the Enlightenment to the forefront of political discourse.110 
At the same time, the impact legal scholars and legal decisions have on 
                                                          
106 As economics would describe us, “human capital.”  
107 See MAX HORKHEIMER & THEODOR W. ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT (Gunzelin 
Schmid Noerr ed., Edmund Jephcott trans., Stanford Univ. Press 2002) (1987). See also, Alex Ross, 
The Naysayers, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 15, 2014) 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/15/naysayers; Marcel Stoetzler, ‘It Only Needs All’: 
Re-reading Dialectic of Enlightenment at 70, OPEN DEMOCRACY (June 24, 2017), 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/marcel-stoetzler/it-only-needs-all-re-reading-
dialectic-of-enlightenment-at-70. 
108 For an example of the pervasiveness of the method, see Oren Gazal-Ayal, Economic Analysis 
of “Law & Economics,” 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 787, 801 (2007).  
109 See Noam Chomsky & David Barsamian, Noam Chomsky Diagnoses the Trump Era, THE 
NATION (Oct. 3, 2017) https://www.thenation.com/article/noam-chomsky-diagnoses-the-trump-era/. 
See also Rosamund Hutt, What Do Young People Value?, THE WORLD ECON. F. (Jan. 20, 2016) 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/what-do-young-people-value/ (finding that “[o]ver 90% 
believe that business is the way to solve problems like unemployment”). 
110 Micheline Ishay, European Integration: The Enlightenment Legacy, 19 HIST. OF EUR. IDEAS, 
207-213 (1994). But cf., Nikita Dhawan, Rescuing the Enlightenment from the Europeans, THE EUR. 
MAG. (Apr. 27, 2015), https://www.theeuropean-magazine.com/nikita-dhawan/10063-the-migrant-
crisis-and-enlightenment-values. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss1/9
  
 
 
 
 
2019] THE INFLUENCE OF LAW-AND-ECONOMICS 265 
 
 
 
 
society continues to be limited by the nature of the civil system.111 As a 
result, the cross-national legislation aimed at promoting arguably 
“progressive” ideals does not have to run the gauntlet of an adversely 
predisposed, conservatively bent judiciary.112 The supranational treaties 
that have the force of law for individual nations within the EU are also 
shaping a coherent European approach to civil society.113 This is true 
because the treaties themselves are based on “progressive” social values, 
like equality, a value that promotes the main goal of the European Union: 
to prosper together and avoid conflicts between the forming nations. 
Cooperation between member states and eventual economic integration is 
fundamental.114 Most of the values espoused in the Enlightenment are thus 
embodied within the very structures of the European Union.  
                                                          
111 Because in continental Europe any legal decision has limited precedential value, the impact 
of judicial determinations is necessarily more restricted than in the United States. This distinction is 
fundamental and has been exhaustively analyzed in other circumstances. For the purposes of this Note, 
it is sufficient to remark that the nature of the civil system itself, for better or worse, limits the impact 
on civil society of both the actual judicial decisions and of legal commentary on those decisions. See 
Linda Ravo, The Role of the Principle of Effective Judicial Protection in the EU and Its Impact on 
National Jurisdictions, in SOURCES OF LAW AND LEGAL PROTECTION 101, 101-25 (2012).  
112 As long as the law being proposed does not violate a Treaty, The European Court of Justice 
will not inquire into any other faults. See Ravo, supra note 111. This can be contrasted to the extensive 
power of review the judiciary has in the United States, established by the Marshall court in Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).  
113 See MARINUS OSSEWAARDE, MEDCRAVE GRP. LLC , THE SOCIOLOGISTS’ STRUGGLE FOR A 
EUROPEAN IDENTITY ( 2017), 
https://ris.utwente.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/17963158/Ossewaarde_The_Sociologists_Struggle_for_a_E
uropean_Identity.pdf.  
114 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, art. 2, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 
11 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome] (“It shall be the aim of the Community, by . . . progressively 
approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote [the] harmonious development of 
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The European Union’s transnational structure has not led to an easy 
and seamless shift to a post-tribal, globalized Europe, but it has 
significantly pushed the center of the political arena to the “left” of the 
political spectrum, at least as perceived from an American viewpoint. Of 
course, there is a colorable argument that from the point of view of the 
Europeans themselves they are merely living up to their founding values, 
and the “left” tinge of their policies is nothing but a purely centrist 
approach.115 Nations within the European Union feel constant pressures to 
conform with directives from Brussels, allowing for yet another avenue of 
progressive change in their national laws. These pressures are also felt by 
the natives of the constituent countries, which by and large, have more 
liberal views of the world when compared to their transatlantic cousins.116 
The drive from Brussels to accept multiculturalism and universal tolerance 
at a local level is a modern European development with no true federal 
counterpart in United States state politics.117  
                                                                                                                                    
economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increased stability, an accelerated raising 
of the standard of living and closer relations between its Member States.”). 
115 This may be true also because the political systems of continental Europe are 
overwhelmingly multi-party systems. These types of political systems will tend to be less polarized, 
more balanced and coalition-based. This reality in turn will force parties to avoid extreme positions 
and, as such, both the left and the right will actively fight for the centrist vote, reinforcing in the 
process more moderate standpoints. However, a full analysis of the differences between dual-party 
political systems and “polyarchies” is outside the scope of this Note. See generally ROBERT DAHL, A 
PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (50th Anniversary ed. 2006) (comparing Madisonian, populistic, 
and polyarchal forms of democracy).  
116 See, e.g., Mila Versteeg, What Europe Can Teach America About Free Speech, THE 
ATLANTIC (Aug. 19, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/08/what-europe-can-
teach-america-about-free-speech/537186/ (arguing for a balanced, and non-unidimensional approach 
to the right of free speech, modeled after the European laws). Versteeg sees the evolution of human 
rights in Europe after the second World War as the “strongest” in the world. Id. This trend was 
reinforced, she argues, by the framework of the Union itself. She proceeds: “European free-speech 
doctrine is based on the idea that free speech is important but not absolute, and must be balanced 
against other important values, such as human dignity.” Id. 
117 These pressures have had deleterious effects as well. As such, a portion of the population of 
Europe has shifted to extremes; see, for example, the contested general election of 2016 in France. 
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V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
Chicago School’s law-and-economics approach needs to be constantly 
challenged in areas of the law where the methodology it espouses creates 
more problems than it resolves.118 I will concede the enhanced 
applicability of an efficiency-only mode of legal analysis in the context of 
the conflicts that arise between private commercial parties.119 However, 
                                                                                                                                    
Some have even decided to reject the European project altogether, like the British did the same year 
when they voted to exit the European Union. However, this effect seems to be contained at the 
moment with German voters in 2017 supporting Angela Merkel’s policy of refugee acceptance and 
largely rejecting the far-right German party AfD (Alternative für Deutschland). Similarly, there has 
been a significant centrist resurgence in Eastern Europe, with polls now projecting some of the lowest 
shares of those countries Parliaments to be captured by far-right parties.  
118 Strauss, supra note 64. 
119 When the interests involved are economic in nature, almost to the exclusion of all other 
considerations, it makes sense to predominantly use the tools of economics in the legal analysis. 
However, this presupposes an equality of bargaining power between the commercial parties, both in 
their initial contractual negotiation and/or during the situation that has evolved from their conflict. This 
assumption is almost always empirically wrong and requires judges to adjust their analysis to realities 
present in the case before them. This is one of the reasons why no single methodology or approach can 
be exclusively used in the law.  
Moreover, the controversy has already proven itself beyond the solving power of the business 
people involved, with their pragmatic and efficiency-oriented world views. As such, if they could not 
reach an economically efficient solution to their conflict, as evidenced by their presence before a judge 
in what is usually an expensive litigation process, how is a judge employing only economics in a better 
position? The adjudication process is resorted to by commercial parties only when business 
negotiations break down, and those negotiations break down most often because the parties involved 
could not find a sufficient economic incentive to settle their dispute. See John Bronsteen, Some 
Thoughts About the Economics of Settlement, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1129 (2009) (remarking on 
similarities between justice-oriented approaches to settlement and utility maximization approaches to 
that same topic); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 
968 n.5 (2001) (“[O]ur critique is limited to notions of fairness that give weight to factors unrelated to 
individuals’ well-being . . . .”). 
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even in this limited milieu, the law retains multiple facets, and a myriad of 
other apt methodologies and approaches may be employed.120 Ultimately, 
the main point is that efficiency should not always be dispositive, 
especially if there is a clearly expressed legislative proscription or 
constitutionally enshrined individual right at stake.121  
Outside of commercial law, however, I see no value in a pure utilitarian 
and consequentialist analysis. While those considerations are always going 
to exist within a well-balanced legal analysis, they should be just that: one 
factor among the many. This is because they do not provide enough by 
themselves to be decisive, and when they are pushed to the forefront of 
legal analysis the result is invariably a lopsided decision or commentary.122 
Even if we do not ascribe to the law-and-economics scholars the specific 
intent to influence society toward a purely commodified vision of the 
individual, this is in fact the effect of the oversimplification they are 
advocating. As such, instead of progressing towards solutions to 
                                                          
120 See Bronsteen, supra note 119.  
121 As a case in point, American antitrust law, under the influence of law-and-economics, has 
become overwhelmingly pro-business. There are significant hurdles any prospective plaintiff under the 
Sherman Act must currently overcome to even bring an action of monopolization into court. Basing 
most of their judgments on issues of efficiency, and fears of “ruinous” litigation, the judiciary has all 
but excluded several causes of action, and severely limited others by imposing onerous prima facie 
burdens on would-be plaintiffs and on the regulatory agencies. These developments are a direct 
example of how a focus on economics for a sustained amount of time in a field of law will eventually, 
de facto, overwrite a Congressional statute. Analyzing antitrust with economics makes sense initially, 
but after a while, judges become enamored with the tool they are using and instead of economics being 
just one of the required pieces of evidence in a well-balanced antitrust case, it becomes the only 
evidence required. These modern decisions, thus, are no longer enforcing the Sherman Act, a 
congressional statute that has never been overturned. See generally Fox, Law and Economics, supra 
note 28. See also Horwitz, Law and Economics, supra note 70; Elliot Ash, Daniel L. Chen, & Suresh 
Naidu, The Impact of Legal Schools of Thought (Jan. 25, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-faculty/colloquium/law-
economics/documents/2017_Spring_Ash_Legal.pdf (finding empirical support that “judges who use 
law-and-economics language or attend law-and-economics training are more likely to issue and 
support conservative rulings.”).    
122 See Constitutional Calculus, supra note 72. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss1/9
  
 
 
 
 
2019] THE INFLUENCE OF LAW-AND-ECONOMICS 269 
 
 
 
 
contemporary problems that enhance justice,123 law-and-economics 
enslaves the discipline and practice of law and has it pulling at the wagon 
of privilege.  
To combat this effect, it might arguably be useful to once again look 
across the Atlantic,124 even though the civil systems of law are seen by 
some as incapable of providing useful insights to a modern American 
lawyer.125 The empirical realities of modern European jurisprudential 
commentary and adjudication126 are evidence of a legal profession that is 
devoted to fulfilling the impartial arbiter role I have argued to be 
                                                          
123 See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1851 (1987) 
(“Economic analysis, growing out of the liberal tradition, tends to view all inalienabilities in the way 
traditional liberalism views inalienable property rights. When it does this, economic analysis holds fast 
to one strand of traditional liberalism, but it implicitly rejects – or at least challenges – another: the 
traditional distinction between inalienable and alienable kinds of rights. In conceiving of all rights as 
property rights that can (at least theoretically) be alienated in markets, economic analysis has (at least 
in principle) invited markets to fill the social universe. It has invited us to view all inalienabilities as 
problematic.”) (emphasis added). 
124 There is ample precedent for crosspollination of legal ideas from both sides of the Atlantic. 
See, e.g., Richard H. Helmholz, Use of the Civil Law in Post-Revolutionary American Jurisprudence, 
66 TUL. L. REV. 1649, 1653 (1992) (applying an empirical analysis to several early decisions in the 
United States and concluding that “[t]he survey demonstrated that more than a few American lawyers 
knew and made use of the civil law in arguments offered in courts, and also that American judges cited 
[European decisions during that time].”).  
125 Id. at 1650, n.4 (citing KERMIT L. HALL & PETER KARSTEN, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY 10 (2d ed. 2008)). (“The civil law tradition contributed only modestly to the 
origins of American law.”). The applicability of foreign materials to United States law is, however, a 
hotly disputed issue in itself. See Norman Dorsen, The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. 
Constitutional Cases: A Conversation between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 
INT’L J. OF CONST. L. 519 (2005).  
126 I am referring here to the general political agnosticism of European judges and jurists that 
hopefully has been established by the preceding sections of this Note. 
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fundamental to a healthy law system if we aim for it to help achieve a 
well-functioning civil society. It is, of course, by no means necessary to 
adopt the form of the continental system for its contemporary positive 
effects to manifest in the United States.127 But it is nevertheless useful to 
notice how a related Western system of law has chosen to deal with the 
important question of the proper place for the practice and commentary of 
law in society. The neutrality of the civil system in Europe is helping those 
countries achieve an accurate reflection of their citizenry’s aspirations in 
the form and substance of their laws, mainly by not interfering on the basis 
of extraneous factors like efficiency.  
Ultimately, the issue boils down to awareness of the existence of a 
problem, the definition of that problem, and potential solutions. Law-and-
economics does not see a problem, because it supposes itself “value-
neutral” and even benign in its application.128 However, most scholars and 
judges using law-and-economics behave with the force of a tyrant—only 
efficiency can best explain and dispense law — and they need to be 
constantly opposed in these bold-faced assertions, until the balance within 
the practice and commentary of law in the United States is restored. The 
practice of law needs to be brought back to the aspirational place the 
Founders had envisioned for it; it needs to be, once again, the balanced 
                                                          
127 Arguably, the common law system is better suited for the impartial arbiter role I am 
advocating the legal profession should embrace. It is not the intention of this Note to extol the virtues 
of the civil law system and propose a fundamental change in the American common law. On the 
contrary, when the common law is not dominated by dogmatic approaches like law-and-economics, 
the system will inherently favor balanced and reasonable adjudication, perhaps to a higher degree than 
the civil system. This Note’s scope is limiting, however, any further inquiry into this topic. For an 
interesting perspective on the topic see William Ewald, What’s So Special About American Law, 26 
OKLA. CITY. UNIV. L. R. 1083, 1087 (2001) (arguing that “the mere presence or absence of a civil 
code is hardly the most striking difference between law in America and [other parts of the world].”). 
See also R.H. Helmholz, Continental Law and Common Law: Historical Strangers or Companions, 
1990 Duke L. J. 1207 (1990) (comparing the common law to the civil system with a focus on British 
common law versus the continental civil system in the context of European integration).  
128 See Posner supra note 68; see Easterbrook supra note 46.  
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arbiter that operates in, and grounds the, “true center” of American 
society. 
Sebastian Ciobotaru* 
 
 
                                                          
* Staff Editor (2017-2018), Washington University Global Studies Law Review; J.D. (2019), 
Washington University School of Law; B.A. National School of Political Science, Bucharest, RO; 
Certificate in Philosophy from University of Bucharest. I would like to thank my beautiful wife and 
amazing daughter for always brightening my days. 
 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
